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WHAT WAS ABRAHAM LINCOLN'S CREED?
BY GEORGE M. MC CRIE.
In the Westminster Revie^v for September Mr. Theo-
dore Stanton draws to a close the fourth of a brilliant
series of articles upon Abraham Lincoln with the fol-
lowing words :
"A word still remains to be said about Lincoln's religious be-
lief,—or, shall I say, non-belief ? Messrs. Nicolay and Hay and
Mr. Herndon devote considerable space in their Lives to this as-
pect of their hero. That Lincoln was an orthodox Christian no-
body pretends to assert. But his friends and biographers differ
as to how much of a Christian he was. If Lincoln had lived and
died an obscure Springfield lawyer and politician, he would un-
questionably have been classed by his neighbors among Free-
thinkers." {^IVestmiitster Rtndeiv^ p. 264.)
Then follows a sentence which at once recalls the
Westminster Abbey ceremonial over the remains of
Charles Darwin :
"But, as is customary with the church, whether Roman
Catholic or Protestant, when Lincoln became one of the great of
the world, an attempt was made to claim him. In trying to ar-
rive at a correct comprehension of Lincoln's theology [?] this fact
should be borne in mind in sifting the testimony." (Ibid. 264-5.)
It may be added that the "attempt" in question
is generally more vehement in proportion to the scanti-
ness of the evidence in favor of orthodoxy. And this
for obvious reasons. No man thoroughly, or even
mainly, "at one" with, the popular religious belief of
his age, requires any orthodox verification, or identifi-
cation, after his decease. In such cases, not to have
condemned current religious beliefs implies acquies-
cence in their reasonableness and utility. And it is
just here, I think, that Mr. Stanton, in face of the
very evidence, so carefully and minutely gathered by
himself, comes to a wrong conclusion in Lincoln's
case. I italicise in the following extract:
" Another very important warping influence which should not
be lost sight of was Lincoln's early ambition for political prefer-
ment. Now, the shrewd American politician with an elastic con-
science joins some church, and is always seen on Sunday in the
front pews. But the shrewd politician who has not an elastic con-
science—and this was Lincoln's case—simply lieeps miiiii on Ins ;v-
tigioits 'ic--i's, or. when he must touch on the subject, deals only
in platitudes. And this is just what Lincoln did." (Ibid. p. 265.)
In support of this Mr. Stanton quotes from Hern-
don's "True Story of a Great Life," p. 439, as follows :
" Inasmuch as he was so often a candidate for public
"office, Mr. Lincoln said as little about his religious
"opinions as possible, especially if he failed to coin-
" cide with the orthodox world." Now, this is evi-
dence of Lincoln's declinature to mix up religious
opinions with politics, but it is evidence of nothing
more. But how about the following passage, which
Mr. Stanton also quotes from Herndon's "True Story,"
p. 446-7. " In 1854," says Mr. Herndon, "he asked me
"to erase the word God from a speech which I had
"written and read to him for criticism, because my
"language indicated a personal God, whereas he in-
" sisted no such person ever existed." This was not
"keeping mum on his religious views." It was as-
serting the position of an Atheos. According to the
testimony of Justice David Davis, Lincoln "had no
"faith in the Christian sense of the term- had faith
"in laws, principles, causes and effects." I fear also
what Mrs. Abraham Lincoln says of him : "His only
"philosophy was that what is to be will be, and no
"prayers of ours can reverse the decree." I not only
say Atheos then, in this case, but Hylo Atheos. See-
ing that his was not mere indifference, no mere uni-
versal Scepticism or Pyrrhonism, but a self-argued-out
conviction of the suffering of the Cosmos without an
Anima Alundi, and of the human organism without an
Anima humana.
"Lincoln thought little on theological subjects and
"read still less," continues Mr. Stanton (W. R. 265).
Read this in connexion with the testimony of Mr. John
T. Stuart, his first law partner, quoted in the following
page, and it becomes no longer remarkable. "He
" [Lincoln] was an avowed and open infidel, and some-
"times bordered on atheism." A distinctly two fold
attitude is here indicated— infidelity towards, or re-
jection of, current orthodoxy and negation of, at all
events, a personal Deity. Now, an honest mind, such
as that of Lincoln cannot "border on" Atheism and,
at the same time, show Theistic or Deistic leanings.
And, this understood, a light is thereby shed on some
of his utterances which might otherwise be open to
misconstruction. Thus, for example, to say, as Lin-
coln did, according to Mr. Herndon's record, "All
"such questions [moral and social reforms] must first
"find lodgment with the most enlightened souls who
"stamp them with their approval. In God's own time
" [I italicise] they will be organised into law, and thus
"woven into the fabric of our institutions, " "(_True
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Story," p. 167) simply means that, /« the march of
events such and such would happen. A mere passing
phrase like this can no more be construed into a pro-
fession of Theistic belief than can the slang invocation
vulgarly associated vi'ith the act of sneezing. Mr.
Stanton sees this and, accordingly, does not reckon
with the expression in his summing up, which runs as
follows :
" A man about whose theology [?] such things can be said is
of course far removed from orthodoxy. It may even be ques-
tioned whether he is a theist, whether he is a deist. That he is a
free-thinker is evident ; that he is an agnostic is probable. Addi-
son's line seems to fit the case : 'Atheist is an old-fashioned word
:
I am a free-thinker.' " (W. R. p. 266.)
This is merely playing round the fringes of the
issue. "Old-fashioned words" have often a definite
meaning which newer coinages lack. "Free-thinker"
means anything or nothing. Thought—of the cor cor-
dium—is ever unbound, though the written or spoken
expression of it may be fettered. The term has no
dynamic character. As well might one speak of an
"Opinionist." "Agnostic," again, simply equals the
minus sign, and has, moreover, associations of a su-
perfine and superficial nature wholly foreign to Lin-
coln's sturdy personality. Falsetto negation is fashion-
able ;—as a writer in the National Reformer (Sept. 6,
1 891) neatly puts it— " Great is the virtue of a large
"octavo page, good type, the words 'an agnostic,' and
"the imprint of Williams and Norgate." But plain
words are best. That he was Atheos connotes a defi-
nite attitude towards the great religionist chimsera, and,
apart from some minor disadvantages of association,
really defines Lincoln's position more closely than any
of Mr. Stanton's epithets. It is positive not negative,
indicates what the man professedly was, rather than
what he was not or what he oppugned. The immem-
orial two-fold problem— "What is and what do I
"know?" demands not a quibble, but a rational, defi-
nite reply. Only one synthetic system faces this two-
fold issue. All Free-thinking, Agnosticism, Parker-
ism, etc., but palter with this supreme creed. And
that is the Scientific Idealism which, based on the con-
crete, yet focuses the rays of all possible knowledge
in the individual self, knower and known in one. The
answer is complete only in Hylo-Idealism.
It is not necessary to stretch the point too far by
crediting Lincoln with having excogitated a "world-
scheme," so profoundly simple yet simply profound,
from the perusal of " tomes of metaphysic lore." These
in all probability would with him have confused the
issue. Though he rationally apprehended it, possibly
he might not have been able to give a logical reason
for the faith that was in him—but his already-quoted
expression points unquestionably to a solipsismal con-
clusion. "All such questions [moral and social re-
" forms] must first find lodgment with the most en-
" lightened souls who stamp them with their ap-
"proval. " This is true Meliorism, from the brain out-
wards, as opposed to the dream of a ready-made New
Jerusalem descending from the skies. Not unnat-
urally, however, his formula invites amendment. For
the phrase ^'fnd lodgment with the most enlightened
" souls should be substituted, springfrom the most power-
''ful individual intellect,'" The individual Ego—not a
group of Egos is the last recess of thought. It is du-
alism not Auto-Monism which views all Egos as on
one plane. The common phrase of Secularism "One
world at a time " has an inner meaning which Sec-
ularists miss. The world is to every man as it af-
fects him—to each "a different world." That other
Egos are in my self-created Cosmos can only be a sec-
ondary, never a primary, conclusion. With my own
Cosmos I alone have to do,—but, inasmuch as it is in-
dissolubly one with me, I apprehend the existence of
other Egos. In the words of the late Miss Constance
Naden " the Ego in its entirety is the universe as felt
"and known." Empiricism has to do with the man-
ifold— Scientific Idealism with the simple unit, includ-
ing all its content and intent. But to continue. Note
Lincoln's complete and significant indifference to pop-
ular religionism. Mr. Stanton furnishes us with the
following instances of this (W. R. p. 265) "The text
"of the greatest moral document of his Presidency,
"the Emancipation Proclamation, contains, as orig-
" inally drawn up in secret with his own hand, no
"mention of God; and what is still more significant,
" when the 'omission' was pointed out to him, by one
"of his Cabinet officers, he simply incorporated into
"the text the religious paragraph offered him." And
again "When a convention of clergymen passed a
" resolution requesting the President to recommend to
" Congress an ainendment to the Constitution, recog-
"nising the existence of God, Lincoln prepared a first
"draft of a message to this effect. 'When I assisted
" him in reading the proof,'—says Mr. Defrees, Super-
" intendent of Public Printing during Lincoln's ad-
" ministration,— 'he struck it out, remarking that he
"had not made up his mind as to its propriety.'"
I emphasise these specially notable words. ^^ He
'
' had not made up his mind as to its propriety. " In plain
words an affirmation that the God-idea is fathered by
and comes and goes, not only with the individual con-
sciousness, but with individual opinion as to its "pro-
priety" in given circumstances. Could the supremacy
of the individual Ego be more explicitly stated? But
I need scarcely add that a Deity thus shelved or not
shelved, according to the dictates of political expedi-
ency, or of individual opinion as to the "propriety"
of either course, is no Deity at all. He is as fictional
as the "John Uoe " or "Richard Roe" of a legal
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writ, and anyone making use of such a creation—the
puppit not the parent, of his own Egoitj'—is supposed
to know with what he is dealing. Orthodox rehgion-
ism may well despair of Abraham Lincoln as of George
Washington, Benjamin Franklin, or President Jeffer-
son. And this being the case, we are in a position to
define his life-creed with all due measure of exactness.
The only possible alternatives open to a mind so sin-
cere as his, are two in number. They are compe-
tently indicated in the following extract from a recent
philosophical treatise by Professor Veitch :
"The natural outcome of the Hegelian conception on what
may be called the abstract side is simply that the individual is a
' reflection,' the passing reflection of the all-comprehending sub-
stance.
. . .
The absolute is the flow of the individuals of time and
space—thought is the thought of conscious individuals— the sum
of natural law is the divine. On the other hand, as the individual
contains the abstract universality, and gives it meaning and being,
the supreme principle or ground of all is simply a projection of
the likeness of the individual himself on the mirror of his own
consciousness." (" Knowing and Being," p. 310.)
Looking at the evidence above stated, there can be
no hesitation in applying Abraham Lincoln's life-per-
suasion to the latter category.
CONTROVERSIAL MATERIALISM, OR WHAT DO WE
MEAN BY MATTER?
BY EDMUND NOBLE.
'^fn/brttiatio seiisits semper est ex analogia kotninis
non ex analogia universi : atqia magna prorsus
errore asseritur, sensttm esse mensuram rerumy
[Bacaft^ Tnstauratio Magna.]
Has so-called " materialism " a real, or only a con-
troversial value ? This issue has been raised anew by
many recent discussions on the relation of science to
religion, and it may be well to attempt at least a pro-
visional reply to the question. It is by no means gen-
erally appreciated by those who take part in such dis-
cussions that the names they use do not in any case
correspond with the things indicated by them, but are
always simply representations of those things, and
representations of them in terms of human knowledge.
Even clever dialecticians and profound thinkers some-
times lose sight of the truth that the concepts which
their terms stand for always mean and only mean, not
the thing indicated in its actuality, as existing inde-
pendently of them, but only that knowledge about the
thing which the mind possesses at any particular stage
of mental development. In any scientific view of the
meaning of knowledge, we can know nothing of ob-
jects in the external world apart from the effects which
they produce in us—apart from the particular way in
which we, as human organisms, feel and deal with
their actions upon us and upon one another. Our
idea of a thing, though it may represent that thing
with more or less accuracy, is thus simply made up
of the effects which the thing produces in us, is no
more than our way of knowing it purely special to
us, and not a universal way which would be valid
for every kind of organism whatsoever. Our knowl-
edge of things has thus several important limitations.
In the first place, we can only directly know such
things as are capable of acting on us ; secondly, we
can know objects only in ways that are imposed by
our own organism—that is to say, by the senses through
which we directly know their qualities ; thirdly, we
can possess only such kind and amount of knowledge
as, up to any particular time, we may happen to have
accumulated. The error which most people commit
by neglect of these limitations is the error of taking
appearances for the things themselves, and this alone
has led to some of the most serious defects of the sub-
jective method. .But there is the still graver error
that has eaten its way into the fabric of all popular
thinking until the wisest heads may well begin to de-
spair of its elimination—the error, that is to say, of
regarding our concept of a thing at any given period
as representing the total qualities of the thing, the sum
of its powers and characters, and of believing, which
most of us tacitly do, that we may use our concept,
as if we were dealing with the thing in its totality.
Why is this an error, and why is it an error of the
gravest kind ? It is an error because our concept of
an object has a content of qualities or characters that
varies according to the stage of our mental growth.
It is an error of the most serious import for thinking
because, by using the concept we have at any particu-
lar stage of knowledge as representing the whole of
the characters of the thing known, we are led to make
assertions regarding that thing which, while seeming
true for the few qualities by which we know it, are
often totally untrue for the thing itself, and even for
the thing as it is represented by the concept at a more
advanced stage of our knowledge.
That our concept of a thing undergoes gradual in-
crease in its content—that it begins with only a few
qualities and ends with many—may be shown by the
history of terms. The most simple and most salient
characters of an object—characters of sound, action,
color, or shape—are always the first to be known, and
it is the most prominent of these which the mind de-
scribes in the act of conferring the name. Thus the
ant was called " swarmer " because "swarming" was
the character by which it attracted attention ; serpent
was so named from its "creeping" motion; heaven
was regarded as a thing "heaven" up; and "sky"
came into existence to indicate that which seemed to
"cover " the earth. Now all these names, when first
used, were alive with the meaning thus given to them ;
but they remained thus vital only for the early stage
of man's knowledge of the objects named. For as men
came to know more of the ant, the serpent, the heaven.
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and the sky—as their concepts of these grew richer in
content—the descriptive meaning of the term died
away, and the name originally alive became a mere sym-
bol signifying not one quality of the thing named, but
the whole of its qualities. Thus nobody thinks of the ant
as a "swarmer, " of the serpent as a "creeper," or of
the heaven as "heaven" up, for the reason that so
much is known concerning these things in addition to
"swarming," "creeping," etc., as to dwindle such
meanings into insignificance and make it unnecessary
to preserve them as elements of the name. By a like
process, the Russian called the duck utka because he
saw it plunge its beak into the water ; the Pole called
it kaczka because he noticed that it waddled in walk-
ing ; and the Bosnian gave it the name of plovka be-
cause he observed it swimming
;
yet in their survival,
none of these terms suggest to the user of them the
character from which they originally sprang—they
imply and designate the duck in all its characters. So
when we speak of the cuckoo we mean, not a bird
making the ku-ku sound, but an organism of a par-
ticular kind, with particular size, plumage, charac-
ter, and habits. In the last application of it, then, we
mean by a name the total quality of the thing named,
and the passage from the primitive value of our term
to its final symbolic value takes ^\a.ce pari passu with
our advancing knowledge of the qualities which it
connotes.
The commonest experiences of the individual and
the race tell the story of this gradual increase in the
richness of the concept. The growth of the child
mind illustrates a steadily increasing knowledge of the
qualities of things
;
progress from ignorance to knowl-
edge in the adult is largely an advance of the same
kind. " Stone " to the uncultured man is merely a
hard substance of a particular size, shape, color, and
weight; to the geologist the concept has a rich con-
tent of both chemical and physical characters, and de-
mands for its thorough realisation as an idea familiar-
ity with the whole history of the planet. So to the
ignorant man, "stars," originally things "strewn" are
little more than
" Specks of tinsel fixed in heaven
To liglit the midnights of his native town : "
while to the educated, and above all to the scientific
mind, the concept "star" is rich with thoughts of
cosmical processes and has a content of materials
drawn from well-nigh every department of knowledge.
Look next at the concept of "matter." Not very long
ago the characters connoted by the term were very
meagre. The first known "matter" meant little more
than the most simple and more obvious qualities, such
as those of color, size, shape, weight, hardness or
softness; so that when a man spoke of "matter" he
meant nothing but these. Note now how enormously
this primitive idea has been enlarged, even within the
last hundred years, by the constant addition to it of
new qualities in "matter" that have been brought to
light by modern investigation. It is within the mem-
ory of men still living that the possibility of "matter"
existing in a gaseous and invisible state was unknown,
and the effect of such ignorance was to deny to " mat-
ter "the power of assuming the gaseous condition.
Up to a period still more recent, the luminiferous
ether was excluded from the category of "matter"
through the mind clinging to its old concept and re-
fusing to believe that "matter" could manifest the
characters which the ether was known to possess.
Yet the advanced modern physicist no more hesitates
to regard the characters displayed by ether as char-
acters of "matter" than he hesitates to accept the ma-
terial character of the phenomena manifested by gas.
In these two particulars alone, therefore, the concept
"matter" has been enlarged from its former narrow
meaning of "tangible" and "visible" to that wider
meaning which claims the term for the whole range of
the invisible world—whence it may be said that the
universe no more means earth, sun, planets and stars,
but the total ether system in addition to these. The
same modern research, moreover, which has thus ex-
tended the domain of "matter" has also given us a
vastly richer knowledge of its qualities in detail. We
now know it to possess physical, chemical, and electro-
magnetic characters that only a few years ago were
not even suspected. Yet when the knowledge of these
new characters first dawned upon the mind, the hard,
rigid framework of the old concept of "matter" re-
fused to yield them admission, and for a time men
tried to find a place for the mysterious qualities out-
side the category of "matter." Once, for example,
light was regarded as due to luminous corpuscles pro-
jected at immense speed from heated bodies : now we
know it to be wave-disturbances of the same ether so
long believed to be non-material. Once heat was a
subtle immaterial something that could be poured as
it were, from body to body : now we know it to be due
to the movements of the parts of the masses heated.
Once electricitj' was deemed to be a mysterious fluid :
now we recognise in it a mode of ether motion impli-
cating the parts of tangible bodies. In a word, the
numberless qualities which, because they did not seem
to harmonise with our earlier and imperfect concept
of "matter," we excluded from our notion of "mat-
ter," have in recent years not only been included in
the concept, but have become essential to our modern
idea of "matter." The same is true of our idea of
" matter" as it exists in organisms. How hard, inert
atoms could display the phenomena of life was for a
long while inexplicable, and men, rightly rejecting
such a supposition as absurd, were driven to the ex-
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pedient of regarding life as non-material—of inventing
for its explanation a subtle vital force, present speci-
ally in the organism, but to be found nowhere else in
all the inorganic world. Yet nothing is now clearer
than that, highly special and peculiar as are the char-
acters of life, they are no more and no less than char-
acters of "matter" aggregated under the highly spe-
cial and peculiar circumstances which condition " mat-
ter" in the organism. The like may be said of mind
and consciousness. Clinging to our narrower concept
of "matter," we have long resisted the notion—not
that consciousness can be "matter" or its movements,
for that idea is obviously irrational—but that " matter"
in particular states of aggregation can manifest the
characters we call consciousness and mind. Yet in
the growth and increasing richness of our concept of
"matter" we are finding out that even characters like
consciousness and mind must be brought into our
concept— not that they must be narrowed into the
petty limits of the early idea of ' ' matter, " but that the
concept of "matter" must be widened to take them
in—not that we must regard consciousness and mind
as "matter," or even as the movements of "matter,"
but that we must view them as ultimately due to the
power which "matter" manifests.
Let us now apply these principles to some of the
popular discussions which have taken place from time
to time on the subject of religion and science. It is
still quite common among writers who oppose so-
called "materialism" to bring the old narrow concept
of "matter" into contrast with some of the new qual-
ities which have been discovered in "matter," and to
base upon the contrast an argument which relegates
such qualities to a completely non-material sphere.
Thus Dubois-Reymond wrote :
"It remains entirely and forever inconceivable that it should
signify a jot to a number of carbon and hydrogen, nitrogen and
oxygen, and other atoms how they lie and move : In no way can
one see how from their concurrence consciousness can arise : "
The same idea has been expanded by Prof. G. F. Bar-
ker, of Yale College :
"Is there not behind this material substance a higher than
molecular power in the thoughts which are immortalised in the
poetry of a Milton or a Shakespeare the art creations of a Michael
Angelo or a Titian, the harmonies of a Mozart or a Beethoven ?"
But perhaps the best known example of this kind of
reasoning is from the vigorous pen and cultured mind
of Dr. James Martineau, who wrote during the Tyn-
dall controversy
:
" By what manipulation of your resources will you educe con-
sciousness ? No organism can ever show you more than matter
moved Surely you must observe how this ' matter ' of yours
alters its style with every change of service ; starting as a beggar,
with scarce a rag of ' property ' to cover its bones, it turns up as
a Prince when great undertakings are wanted. Such extremely
clever matter—matter that is up to everything, even to writing
Hamlet and finding out its own evolution, and substituting a mole-
cular plebiscite for a divine monarchy of the world, may fairly be
regarded as a little too modest in its disclaimer of the attributes
of mind."
All these positions, representing arguments that
constantly recur in the discussions of the hour, are
generically alike, and their validity depends wholl}' on
what is meant by the term "matter"—on the number
and kind of qualities which it connotes. If in using
the word "matter" the arguer has already abstracted
from the conception that which he has included under
other conceptions, such as those of "mind," and
"consciousness," his position will be substantially
this: "I have divided phenomena [we may suppose
him saying] into three classes. To certain characters
presented to me in knowledge I give the name of
' matter ' ; to certain other characters which appear
to me to differ from ' matter ' and from one another I
give the names 'consciousness' and 'mind.' There-
fore, this mental separation effected, I must protest
against any attempt to say that the phenomena I call
' mind ' and ' consciousness ' are identical with and
of the same kind as the phenomena which I call ' mat-
ter. ' " When, in other words, a man deliberately be-
lieves and confirms himself in the belief that " matter"
can only be hard, and inert, and move, and cannot
produce the phenomena which he calls "mind" and
"consciousness," and believes this because he has
already abstracted from his concept of "matter" and
of what " matter " is capable of producing, that which
he has determined to call by other names, then all at-
tempt to show that from his "matter," "conscious-
ness," and "mind" must follow is naturally resisted
by him. But in dealing thus with "matter" he is
dealing all this time not with "matter" as it acts and
operates externally to him, independently of him and
his knowledge, but with a particular concept of " mat-
ter " which is in his mind, with what his mind knows
of the external reality at a particular stage of mental
development. For his attitude to be correct he must
know, not that "mind" and "consciousness" are not
identical with "matter"—for that is conceded—but
that "matter" cannot under any circumstances mani-
fest the characters which he chooses to describe as
characters of "consciousness" and "mind." Other-
wise his claim is quite intelligible, and,—admitting
the validity of his concept— even reasonable. For if
we persist in narrowing our concept of "matter" down
to the simplest qualities—if we regard it as made up
of hard, inelastic atoms only, capable only of move-
ment, and therefore capable only of the limited powers
of producing phenomena which we attribute to move-
ment—then we shall find no room whatever in our
concept for the characters of "consciousness" and
" mind." But we might with just as good reason deny
to our "matter" thus simplified the various physical.
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chemical, electro-magnetic, and vital characters which
modern research has imported into the concept. We
might say, imitating Du Bois-Reymond, that it is in-
conceivable how from the concurrence and movements
of the ultimate parts of "matter" a flash of lightning
should result. Could any one, holding to the ancient
concept of "matter" explain from it the phenomena
of light ? By what manipulation of the material re-
sources of 200 years ago would the theorist educe the
mysterious stresses in ether out of which electro-mag-
netic phenomena arise—could any gross, tangible,
mechanical process ever show him anything more than
"matter" moved? Where is the logician of to-day
who, with nothing but the old concept of "matter "to
guide him, would undertake to declare why a current
of electricity should turn a bar of soft iron into a mag-
net, or why a solar disturbance should set all the com-
pass needles on the earth vibrating ? To the savage,
still shut out from the new knowledge of "matter," it
must remain for ever inconceivable that he can talk
for twenty miles through a telephone wire : in his
mental world the transmission of speech over such dis-
tances and by such means is not to be explained by
any concurrence of atoms, or by movements of them.
And he would be a cultured barbarian indeed, who,
were you to show him some of the simplest modern
experiments in physics and chemistry, would not at
once separate the new qualities disclosed to him into
a class apart from " matter—would not, that is to say,
regard them as belonging to some non-material sphere,
some mysterious realm of "spirit."
Note, moreover, how totally beside the question at
issue is the contrast so often set up between "ideas,"
"thought," "consciousness," "molecular move-
ments, " and " material particles." As nobody has ever
claimed that the size, color, velocity, or the tempera-
ture of a body is "matter," so nobody has asserted
that ideas are " matter," that thought is " movement,"
that "consciousness" and "mind" are the " dance of
molecules." Yet size, color, velocity, temperature,
are characters manifested by "matter," and so "con-
sciousness" and "thought" are characters displayed
by "matter" in the living and highly organised state.
Life, again, is not "matter"— it is the total series of
structural arrangements, activities, processes, and feel-
ings which " matter " manifests in the organised form.
So light, heat, electricity, magnetism—these are not
"matter," but special modes in which "matter" is
active. In a word, the qualities which we associate
with "matter" are not anything that "matter" is,
but are what "matter" does. They are not always
the acting of "matter " pictured by us as the separate
acting of individual atoms and molecules, but are
sometimes, as in the organism, characters in which
are expressed the associated and co operating activity
of countless millions of atoms and molecules. It is
not that "matter" "alters its style with every change
of service," but that it alters its service with every
change of condition, and that as its worldly circum-
stances improve it exerts higher powers and displays
finer raiment. Do we expect to find in the simple dust-
heap the sensitiveness, the mobility, the complexity,
and the stored up energy of a mass of protoplasm ?
This very change in the powers of " matter" by change
of its circumstances is an idea rendered familiar to us
by the commonest experience of our individual and
racial life. How constantlj' do we not, by some new
collocation of our resources, attain results which at
first, in the apparent poverty of those resources,
would have seemed quite impossible of achievement.
When instrumental music had not yet been born, what
human being with his simple ideas about wood and
metal, could have conceived that by mere manipula-
tion of such resources men could have educed the
complex and ravishing notes heard in our modern
concert rooms. Or when a picture was a mere ' ' scratch-
ing, " as its name implies, into whose imagination
could there have entered the thought of modern art
and its magic possibilities ?
It is true enough—and no genuine scientist will be
found to deny it—that between the thing ordinarily
conceived of as " matter " and some of the phenomena
to which "matter" is capable of giving rise, there is
a difference amounting to a total difference of kind.
Dr. Paul Carus is indisputably right in saying [Fun-
damental Problems, 2nd edition, p. 353], "A motion
is a change of place ; and force is expended wherever
a change of place occurs. The thing moved is ma-
terial, but the motion itself is not material. When we
speak of a man's ideas we mean his ideas, not the
material particles of his brain To define matter
as an all-comprehensive term which has to include all
features of reality is an unjustifiable license." But
these positions, as laid down by Dr. Carus, are not
really disputed for a moment by the so-called mater-
ialist ; and the only persons who assert that he denies
them—and claim that by "thought " he merely means
particles of "matter" or the movements of such par-
ticles—are the very controversial theologians who have
so wofuUy misunderstood what they term the material-
istic tendencies of modern scientific thought. All the
scientist seeks to show is that the thing called " mat-
ter," whatever it be in its nature, gives rise not only
to movement, but also to subjective phenomena which
cannot by any stretch of the imagination be identified
with the bare concept of "matter " or even with the
concept of "matter" moving. What is asserted by
the scientist, is not that "consciousness," "mind,"
and " life " are " matter," are the movements of "mat-
ter," are so much dancing of molecules fore-posited
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as dead and inert and therefore as incapable of the
very powers in issue, but that "hfe," "mind," "con-
sciousness " are phenomena potential in all " matter,"
but displayed by it only in certain states of material
aggregation. However much, therefore, from the
standpoint of the old concept of "matter " we may
sympathise with the sneer at the "gospel of dirt,"
and "the mud philosophy," we cannot but regard it,
from the standpoint of the new concept of "matter"
and its capacities, as the self-ridicule of a low and base
view of things, soon to be outgrown.
Finally, it rests with ourselves whether our "mat-
ter " shall be the mere beggar in rags which it still re-
mains for the barbarian, or whether it shall appear to our
enlarged vision in the Princely vestments with which
modern knowledge has clothed it—whether its raiment
shall reflect the poverty of human thought at its very
beginnings, or represent the comparative affluence of
the modern mind—whether, in a word, we shall mean
by it, not the " molecular plebiscite " of Dr. Martineau,
but the divine monarchy in which every man of science
implicitly, if not explicitly, believes by the very act of
believing in the reality of the universe and its pro-
cesses. Modern scientific conceptions are clearly in
favor of a unitary conception of things—of the view
that the power out of which phenomena arise, diverse
as are its products, is fundamentally one in kind. And
when this conception shall have established itself, the
old reproach based so long on an unduly narrow con-
cept of the nature of " matter" will pass away until
the world of the much buffeted and long misunder-
stood "materialist" shall be grander than any yet
dreamed of by the theologian.
CURRENT TOPICS.
The World's Woman's Christian Temperance Union lately in
convention at Washington, censured the fashion of wearing birds
on bonnets, because it encouraged cruelty and the destruction of
useful and innocent fellow beings. Ornamental feathers were also
condemned unless plucked from the birds in a painless way. This
is delightfully sentimental, and there is a sweet and womanly in-
consistency in it that reminds me of a like resolution passed a
few months ago by some ladies in Rhode Island, who afterwards
had what they called a " lovely time " at a clam-bake, where the
clams were all roasted alive. Nothing was said in the platform of
the World's Woman's Christian Temperance Union against the
wearing of seal skin cloaks, which really belong to harmless fellow
creatures, who have been beaten to death with clubs to furnish
the costly raiment. The answer to this charge of inconsistency is
very familiar, "We may kill and torture animals for food and
clothing, but not for decorations and adornment." Why not ? The
bill of sale given to Adam in the garden of Eden makes no distinc-
tion, but confers upon him "dominion over the fish of the sea,
and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that
moveth on the face of the earth." And, says the psalmist, in an-
swer to his own question, What is man that thou art mindful of
him ? Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy
hands ; thou hast put all things under his feet ; all sheep and oxen,
yea, and the beasts of the field, the fowl of the air, and the fish of
the sea, and whatsoever passeth through the paths of the seas."
And from this charter comes the logical deduction that man may
do what he likes with his own. A Sicilian peasant, rebuked by an
American for cruelly beating his mule, retorted, "He has not .
been baptised"; meaning that the mule was not a fellow creature,
but a piece of property that might be bealen at his owner's will.
In the Eastern states there is a useful society called "The
Band of Mercy," and the object of it is the prevention of cruelty
to animals. Its pledge is this, " I will try to be kind to all harm-
less living creatures, and will try to protect them from cruel usage."
Simple as the pledge appears to be, the society itself was not quite
satisfied with its conditional and qualified character, for by a sup-
plementary rule the members are permitted to strike out the word
"harmless," if they choose to do so. The chief merit of the so-
ciety is its valuable influence upon children, teaching them to be
merciful to the lower animals. It has an organ published in Bos-
ton called Our Dumb Animals, in which the beautiful doctrine of
kindness is advocated in a very attractive way. It is not always
logical, but it is not to blame for that, because the whole doctrine
is full of difficulties. For instance, I find in Our Duiith Animals a
little poem asking mercy for the toad, on grounds which appear to
be somewhat out of harmony with the doctrine. The first verse
of it is this :
" Don't kill the toads, the ugly toads.
That hop around your door.
Each meal, the little toad doth eat
A hundred bugs or more."
This reduces the whole doctrine at last to a mere question of hu-
man interest, and human pleasure. Be merciful to the toad, be-
cause he is unmerciful to the bugs ; and the bugs are a nuisance
to us.
What, in the classic vernacular of the schoolboys, is called
" a dead give away," was the charge of Judge Adams to the Grand
Jury impanelled at Chicago for the Novetiiber term. Said the
judge, "In a community like this, where crimes and misdemean-
ors, and proceedings of courts, and almost all matters of public
interest are reported with substantial accuracy in the papers, it
seems almost superfluous to instruct a grand jury of intelligent
men with regard to their duties. " This patronising flattery was
no doubt swallowed like a select oyster by the " intelligent men,"
and relished in the spirit of thanksgiving ; but when it comes to
impanelling the trial jury. Judge Adams will reverse himself, and
decide that knowledge obtained though the public press disqualifies
a juryman, at least knowledge concerning the matter to be tried.
Persons who have had occasion to observe the tendency of Illinois
courts will not be surprised that the intelligence which qualifies
one juryman disqualifies another. This judicial paradox is not
law ; it is one of the " fantastic tricks " played in the name of the
law ; and funny as the antics of a jester in a comic play. Not at
all comical, but altogether serious and significant was the instruc-
tion against " permitting the process and machinery of the court
to be used for the collection of debts." To this he ought to have
added, " or for purposes of persecution and blackmail." Even as
it is, the instruction reads like a sentence, for it includes an inti-
mation that to such base uses have Grand juries been perverted in
Chicago. Critics of our courts, who expose their illegal practices,
do so under peril of contempt and ridicule ; but if they will only
possess their souls in patience, and wait, the time will surely come,
when some talkative and affable judge will confess them from his
place on the bench itself. Then, and not till then, will the reve-
lations get the " public ear " ; and a very long ear it is.
It is a trait of human weakness that we take pleasure in the
tribulations of others, especially if we have suffered the like tribu
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lations ourselves. When I was campaigning in Missouri, a citizen
came into camp one evening and complained that the soldiers had
stolen all his chickens. He demanded "reparation and apology ";
and when he got neither, he sardonically said: "Well, gentle-
men, Mr. Brooks, who lives just beyond me in the timber over
there, has a much finer lot of chickens than mine ; suppose you
try them." The hint was taken, and the chickens too. In a spirit
equally generous, I laughed at that crowd of Chicago clergymen,
mostly Congregationalists I believe, who recently received letters
from the " Department " informing them that packages from Eng-
land awaited them at the Custom House. As it was too early for
Christmas presents, and too late for April Fooling they wondered
what was in the packages. Perhaps dynamite, for another anar-
chist plot had been uncovered, and it might be that the revolution
was to begin by blowing up all the clergy. When they arrived at
the proper bureau, they learned that the packages had been
" seized " at the Post Office by the collector of customs, on sus-
picion that they contained lottery tickets or smuggled goods. On
opening the packages the mischievous character of their contents
was made known. They were deadly books. Reports of the pro-
ceedings had at the International Congregational Council which
met in London last June. Only that, and nothing more. They
were all released from custody, and given to their owners on pay-
ment of the fine levied upon them by the tariff law. A reverend
canon of the Episcopal church received a book from England at
the same time. It was entitled "Holy Communion," and was, I
think, a present from the Bishop of Salisbury, the author of the
book. By convincing the inquisition that the bishop had not con-
cealed any lottery tickets between the leaves, the Canon was al-
lowed to take the book on payment of a tribute of twenty-five
cents. " A heavy tax," he said, " when you consider that the book
is worth but a dollar. Twenty five cents tax on a dollar's worth
of property is a good deal." And yet for twenty years, and more,
the reverend Canon has paid without noticing it, twice that per
centage of taxation on his clothing, and other things. The pay-
ment of a visible and tangible tax of twenty-five cents, is an object
lesson in political economy more instructive than the payment in-
directly of a thousand dollars. This proves that General Othello
was not so mad as he looked when on a memorable occasion he
remarked :
" He tliat is robbed, not seeing -whzt is stolen,
Let him not know it, and he's not robbed at all."
*
'
*
One gratifying result of the " higher criticism," as they call
it now, although it used to go by the name of "infidelity," is that
the eternal prospects for little children who die in infancy are very
much improved. So also is the chance of the heathen, and the
pagan, and " many other persons who have not been called by the
ministry of the word." That quotation is taken frem some reso-
lutions offered by Dr. Briggs before the Presbytery of New York,
during the debate on the revision of the Presbyterian creed. They
did not mean it so, of course, and yet some of the delegates talked
as if salvation was in the keeping of the Presbyterians, and only
to be had on terms prescribed by the Synoa and the General As-
sembly. Dr. Briggs proposed that those terms be made more lib-
eral than formerly, and that the Presbyterians allow more people
to go to heaven in the twentieth century than they did in the nine-
teenth. "Some provision should be made," he said, "for the
salvation of those incapable of being called by the ministry of the
word, and for the heathen." I hope the Presbyterian church will
take the advice of Dr. Briggs, and make provision for the salva-
tion of those persons ; but should it fail to do so, I shall console
myself with a hope, that the Creator has attended to that matter,
and that the necessary provision has been made. The resolution
of Dr. Briggs expands the horizon of hope, but it leaves a little
comfort still for the dear old lady, who said, "The Universalists
believe that all will be saved; but we hope for better things.'
Here is the resolution :
" Infants dying in infancy am
called by the ministry of the w
through the spirit which worketh \
many other persons who have not
other persons who are incapable of being
d are regenerated and saved by Christ
len and where and how he please:h; also
een called by the ministry of the word."
It seems to me that God knows his own children and can pick
them out without the help of the Presbyterian church. As there
is no body so diseased that it cannot be refined into its original
elements when laid in the bosom of its mother earth, so there is
no soul so corrupt that it cannot be purified in the bosom of the
Universal Spirit where every souj will go.
M. M. Trumbull.
NOTES.
Mr. G. M, McCrie is engaged in editing a book containing
posthumous essays by Miss Naden and other articles that have
reference to her. In the preface to the forthcoming volume, the
editor declares that "the interest and attention which have been
aroused by the publication of Miss Naden's Essays, and by the
succeeding Memoir, which appeared last year, suggested the com-
pilation of her further literary Reliques. In the arrangement of
the volume the Editor has endeavored, by introducing several re-
printed papers, culled from the Journal of Science, etc., to add va-
riety to the list now before the reader. The papers which have
already appeared, either in periodical or pamphlet form, are
marked with an asterisk in the Contents. The other papers have
never been published. The appendices are numerous. They con-
sist of some valuable additions and illustrative notes contributed
to the already published papers by Dr. Lewins, and by the Rev.
E. Cobham Brewer, LL. D.—the latter gentleman having kindly
acceded to his notes being reprinted above his signature. To this
department the Editor has also ventured to add a reply written by
himself and forwarded to the Editor of the Coitteinporary Review,
on the appearance in the number for April, of a sketch of Miss
Naden's life, from the pen of Rev. Dr. R. W. Dale of Bir-
mingham."
THE OPEN COURT.
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.
TERMS THROUGHOUT THE POSTAL UNION :
$2.00 PER YEAR. $l.OD FOR SIX MONTHS.
AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND TASMANIA, $2,50 PER YEAR.
N. B. Binding Cases for single yearly volumes of The Open Court will
be supplied on order. Price 75 cents each.
ions should be add essed to
THE OIFEJIT COTTI^T,
(Nixon Building, 175 La Salle Street,)
P. O. DRAWER F. CHICAGO, ILL.
CONTENTS OF NO. 222.
WHAT WAS ABRAHAM LINCOLN'S CREED ? George
M. McCrie 3031
CONTROVERSIAL MATERIALISM, OR WHAT DO
WE MEAN BY MATTER? Edmund Noble 3033
CURRENT TOPICS. Kindness to Animals The Band of
Mercy. Contradictory Qualifications for Jurymen. Seiz-
ing Books in the Post Office. Infant Salvation. Gen.
M. M. Trumbull 3037
NOTES 3038
